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VALUING ASSETS HELD BY PRIVATE
EQUITY FUNDS
By D avid L. Larsen, CPA
In December 2003, the Private Equity
Industry Guidelines Group (PEIGG)
released their U.S. Private Equity Val
u a tio n G uidelines (G u id elin es).
A m ended in Septem ber 2004, the
Guidelines include guidance related
to the valuing of assets held by private
equity funds. As the private equity
industry has m atured over the past
two decades, valuation standards have
become an area of increasing focus
for all industry participants. The
National Venture Capital Association
(NVCA) attempted to focus on valua
tion issues in the late 1980s but could
not reach a consensus on standards.
However, NVCA’s 1989-1990 pro
posed guidelines became the de facto
standards, which are used by a large
num ber of U.S. private equity fund
m anagers in valuing th eir invest
ments.
Outside the United States, private
equity industry groups in several
c o u n trie s a d o p te d sta n d a rd iz e d
guidelines for valuing portfolio com
panies. In early 2005, through a joint
effort of the Association Française des
Investisseurs en Capital (AFIC), the
British Venture Capital Association
(BVCA), and the European Venture
C apital A ssociation (EVCA), the
International Private Equity and Ven
ture Capital Valuation Guidelines
were released. The guidelines were
subsequently endorsed by the Institu
tional Limited Partners Association
(ILPA) and more than 30 other inter
national associations.
Before the in tro d u ctio n of the
PEIGG G uidelines, m any private

equity participants believed that the
development of formal standards or
g u id elin es was im p o rta n t. T he
PEIGG Valuation Guidelines were
created jointly by managers (that is,
general partners) and investors (that
is, limited partners), incorporating
feedback from a wide range of indus
try participants to address this need
in the industry. United States GAAP
for investment companies, including
private equity and venture capital
funds, is p rovided in the AICPA
In v estm en t C om pany A udit and
Accounting Guide. PEIGG has no
authoritative standing in the GAAP
hierarchy and PEIGG guidelines do
not represent authoritative GAAP.
However, the PEIGG valuation guide
lines were prepared to provide pri
vate equity managers with industry
specific best practices in determining
fair value.
The Financial Accounting Stan
dards Board (FASB) is expected to
issue a Standard on “Fair Value Mea
surements” in 2006. The new FASB
Standard will focus attention again
on the need for consistent, compara
ble estimates of fair value in the PE
asset class. PEIGG anticipates revisit
ing the V aluation G uidelines to
ensure that they are not in conflict
with GAAP once the new FASB Stan
dard is effective.

HISTORICAL VALUATION APPROACH
It is difficult to generalize about his
torical valuation approaches without
excluding the nuances used in prac
tice. In the U.S. private equity indus-
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try, private equity investments often
are valued using the de facto NVCA
V aluation G uidelines (never for
mally endorsed by NVCA), which uti
lize cost or the last round of financ
ing as the basis for u n d e rly in g
portfolio companies. Given the diffi
culty and judgment inherent in valu
ing illiquid nonpublic companies,
this approach was often used as a
m ethod for d eterm ining the fair
value of investments. The value of
the investment, however, was gener
ally written down any time the man
ager considered the value impaired.
Basing estimates of fair value on cost
or the most recent round of financ
ing was regarded as conservative,
easy to understand, and not overtly
subject to manipulation. If the value
of the investment begins to increase
or d ecrease, how ever, valuation
based on the most recent round of
financing would no longer be appro
priate. The valuation of securities
issued by private companies differs
from identifying the prices of securi
ties issued by public com panies.
Despite the wide spectrum of invest
ments, from minority investments in
private companies with no obvious
comparables to investments in highly
liquid public securities, it is clear that
investment professionals have the
ability to d eterm ine the value of
most investments, at least at the time
they make the investment. T here
after, until a new round of financing
occurs, or an exit is effected, judg
m en t is necessary to d e te rm in e
whether the value has changed posi
tively or negatively. Some partici

pants are concerned about the relia
bility of measures that are derived
from techniques that are not based
on recent prices.

THE NEED FOR GUIDELINES
The U.S. private equity industry his
torically had not seen a great need
for valuation standards until the
technology bubble burst in 2000. At
that time, limited partners became
concerned that valuations based on
recent rounds may not have rapidly
incorporated changes in value. Stan
dards have also become necessary as
a result of the huge influx of capital
into private equity and because cer
tain limited partners are subject to
Freedom of Information Act disclo
sures, resulting in greater public visi
bility into rates of return of funds in
which they invest.
In addition, many investors who
p re p a re fin an cial statem en ts in
a c co rd a n ce with U.S. generally
a c ce p ted ac co u n tin g p rin c ip le s
(GAAP) are required to record their
investments at fair value. Fair value is
defined as “the amount at which an
investment could be exchanged in a
current transaction between willing
parties, other than in a forced or liq
uidation sale.”1As a result, limited
partner investors are encouraging
fund m anagers to provide timely,
consistent, and robust estimates of
fair value.
An investment manager is gener
ally in a far better position to deter
mine fair value than are individual
investors. Accounting standard set
ters have not provided authoritative

guidelines that would require spe
cific procedures for estimating fair
value of private equity investments.
As a result, private equity managers
n e e d ed a fram ew ork for valuing
investments in portfolio companies
at fair value on a consistent and pru
d e n t basis in o rd e r to provide
greater consistency and transparency
within the private equity industry.

VALUATION OPTIONS
AS PEIGG was evaluating how to
provide the private equity industry
with guidelines that would provide
greater consistency and transparency
for investors, two primary options
were considered:
1. Lower of Cost or Impaired Value
(which would n o t be in accor
dance with GAAP), or
2. Fair Value
The Lower of Cost or Impaired
V alue a p p ro a c h is sim ple and
straightforward and limits volatility.
However, it does not comply with
GAAP for investment companies.
The Fair Value approach has the
p o te n tia l to in crease re p o rte d
interim volatility because it requires
that investments be carried at fair
value at each reporting date, but
complies with GAAP and provides
users of inform ation with greater
transparency into the performance
of the investment.

PEIGG APPROACH
In selecting between the two primary
options for valuing private equity
investments, PEIGG determined that
the industry is best served by focus

1 AICPA Audit and Accounting Guide, Investment Companies, chapter 1, paragraph 3.
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ing on fair value rather than a nonGAAP a p p ro a c h . A fair value
approach would result in the same
valuation being used by a manager
in its GAAP financial statements, its
investor conferences, and its fund
raising docum ents. An approach
that focused exclusively on cost or
the most recent round of financing
could result in different values being
presented by a manager in its finan
cial statem ents and its m arketing
and solicitation documents.
Many funds that currently use the
most recent financing round as the
primary method to value their invest
ments state explicitly in their finan
cial statements that they believe this
method provides their best approxi
mation of fair value. As a result, the
use of a more comprehensive range
of valuation techniques to estimate
fair value, as outlined in the PEIGG
Guidelines, is not not expected to
have an immediate impact on pri
vate equity valuations. Over time, it is
expected that valuations will change
from period to period, up or down,
m ore quickly than they do today.
More frequent changes in valuation
could re su lt in g re a te r in te rim
volatility, bu t will likely result in
fewer large changes in value upon
exit because the exit value of an
in v estm en t will be closer to the
adjusted fair value than it was to the
most recent round.
The perceived increase in volatil
ity under a more robust fair value
a p p ro a c h is u n se ttlin g to some
investors and managers. A parallel
can be drawn with other asset classes
that made the shift to mark-to-mar
ket (“fair value”) valuations. Volatil
ity did occur. This, however, has
been a positive developm ent and
helped in the m aturation of other
asset classes. Private equity is cur
rently at a similar crossroads and
sh o u ld now be p re p a re d to go
through similar growing pains.

DETERMINING FAIR VALUE ON A
CONSISTENT BASIS
The use of fair value requires man
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agers to exercise ju d g m e n t. The
PEIGG Valuation Guidelines provide
a framework whereby different man
agers can approach the valuation
process using a common methodol
ogy. Although managers’ judgm ent
will result in different but support
able views on valuation, using a com
m on m ethodology should narrow
the range of these results.
In p rin c ip le , the G uidelines
encourage the following:
1. All investments should be carried
at their fair value.
2. Quoted prices in active markets
are the best evidence of fair value
and should be used as the basis
for measurement, if available.
3. For investments in private compa
nies, it is appropriate to use cost
or the latest round of financing as
a proxy for fair value for a period
of time.
4. After a period of time, cost or the
latest round of financing becomes
less precise as an approximation
of fair value. Therefore, the man
ager should assess changes in cir
cum stances th a t may lead to
adjustments to the carrying value
of the investm ent. O nce this
assessm ent is m ade, and it is
determined that a change to the
carrying value of the investment is
necessary, the following method
ologies are recommended:
a. Comparable company transac
tions
b. Performance multiples
C. Other valuation methodologies
These estimation techniques are
explained more fully in the Valua
tion Guidelines.

VALUATION POLICY COMMITTEE
To provide input into the valuation
process, the Guidelines suggest that
managers establish a valuation policy
committee. The purpose of the com
mittee is to understand the valuation
policies and procedures of the man
ager and to understand and com
ment on deviations from that policy.
It is not expected that the valuation
policy committee will approve valua

tions, but will serve as a sounding
board, working with the manager to
monitor adherence to a fund’s pol
icy param eters. A fu n d ’s existing
advisory committee may fulfill this
function where appropriate.

IMPACT OF HISTORIC PRACTICE
The first and greatest impact that the
Guidelines are having on the indus
try is to provide a fram ew ork
whereby all private equity invest
ments can be valued using a consis
tent approach.
Initially, it is not expected that
there will be major changes in how a
fund values its investments. Over
time, however, it is expected that
interim valuations will change more
quickly for strongly p e rfo rm in g
investments than in today’s environ
ment. On the margin, this should
not have a significant impact on the
overall fund valuation unless a man
ager has previously used the most
recent round of financing to deter
mine fair value for a period of time
that extends beyond the point when
certain specific factors would indi
cate the fair value had changed since
the most recent round.
Some have expressed concern
that m anagers will be tem pted to
raise valuations too quickly. The
involvement of a valuation policy
com m ittee will help ensure th at
managers implement the Guidelines
in a prudent fashion.

VENTURE CAPITAL CONCERNS
A segm ent of the venture capital
community is uncom fortable with
the theoretical ability to write up an
investm ent w ith o u t in fo rm a tio n
from a subsequent round of financ
ing. This concern is based partly on
the belief that the PEIGG Guidelines
deviate from past p ractices (for
example, the de facto NCVA guide
lines), and partly on concern that
some managers may arbitrarily write
up investments, which would put
pressure on the valuations of other
managers.
As stated in paragraph 30 of the
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G uidelines, “...it is n a tu ra l th a t
decreases in value may be more eas
ily id e n tifie d an d ju stifie d th an
in creases in v a lu e __ How ever,
increases in investm ent fair value
sh o u ld be reco g n ized an d w ar
r a n te d .” PEIGG suggests th at an
increase in value is only warranted
“...where the m anager can clearly
support the increase....” (see para
g rap h s 3 2 -4 2 ). In such circu m 
stances, value is determined by evalu
atin g
co m p arab le
com pany
valuations or considering perfo r
mance multiples.
P a rag ra p h 33 states, “T hese
Guidelines acknowledge that until
p ro d u c t or service acceptance is
achieved, it is unlikely that truly com
p a ra b le com panies with readily
determinable fair values will be read
ily identifiable.”
For early stage venture invest
ments, it may be unusual that a com
parable company could be identi
fied. It may also be rare that an early
stage venture company has sustain
able perform ance upon which to
apply a multiple. Therefore, PEIGG
suggests th a t it may be only in
u n u su a l circum stances th a t an
increase in the value of an early stage
venture investment be warranted or
supportable, “in the absence of mar
ket-based financing events.”

INDUSTRY REACTION
In general, reaction to the Guide
lines from the private equity industry
has b e e n favorable. T he NCVA
Board adopted the following state
ment:
The NCVA recommends that its
members create, follow, and communi
cate clearly the specific procedures and
methodologies used for valuing their
portfolios. These methodologies should
be agreed to by the firm ’s investors (LPs)
and conform when required to Gener
ally Accepted Accounting Principles,
recognizing that the ultimate responsi
bility for valuation remains with the
general partner. When evaluating cur
rent valuation procedures or developing

4

Resources
Investment Companies— AICPA Audit and Accounting Guide
Paperback: Product no. 0 1 6 2 4 ; members: $55; non-members: $ 6 8 .7 5 , Sub
scription to CD-Rom (Product no. DIN-XX) or online (Product no. WIN-XX); mem
bers: $61; non-members: $ 7 6 .2 5 . Available through 1-8 8 8 -7 7 7 -7 0 7 7 or
www.cpa2biz.com

Private Equity industry Guidelines Group
www.PEIGG.org. PEIGG Valuation Guidelines and PEIGG Frequently Asked Ques
tions are available at this site.

Institutional Limited Partners Association
www.ILPA.org

International Private Equity and Venture Capital Valuation Guidelines
www.privateequityvaluation.com

Financial Accounting Standards Board— Fair Value Measurements
www.fasb.org/project/fv_m easurem ent.shtm l

new approaches, the NVCA suggests its
members include a review of the Private
Equity Industry Guidelines Group
(PEIGG) 12/2003 Private Equity Val
uations Guidelines’ document (found
at www.peigg.org) . We commend the fine
efforts of PEIGG, an independent group
which sought and reflected input from
the NVCA and other industry stake
holders. The NCVA encourages dili
gence, prudence, and caution when
implementing the specific elements of
any guideline, such as valuation write
ups of early stage companies in the
absence of market-based fin a n cin g
events.
Subsequent to the NCVA state
ment, the ILPA issued the following
statement:
...ILPA indicated its satisfaction
with the National Venture Capital Asso
ciation’s (NCVA) Board of Directors
Statement. The Statement, which was
sent to all its members, suggests that
members should adopt and document
valuation methodologies that are agreed
with their investors and conform to the
requirement of Generally Accepted
Accounting Principles.
Additionally, the ILPA wishes to
endorse the efforts of the Private Equity
Industry Guidelines Group (PEIGG) in
developing Valuation Guidelines and the

NVCA’s recommendation that the PEIGG
Guidelines be considered the basis for
their member’s valuation procedures and
methodology.
The ILPA has been working with the
PEIGG, the NVCA, AIMR (Association
for Investment Management and
Research) and other participants in the
private equity industry in the United
States in order to support the various ini
tiatives directed at the adoption of Valua
tion Guidelines that conform with the
requirements of GAAP. The ILPA
intends to continue to work with the
PEIGG Valuation Guidelines endorsed or
adopted.
Over time, with the support of
ILPA, the NVCA, m anagers and
investors, the Guidelines will provide
“managers a framework for valuing
investments in portfolio companies
at fair value and to provide greater
consistency within the private equity
industry with regard to valuations.”
PEIGG’s work was a major factor
in encouraging AFIC, NVCA, and
EVCA to come together and create
the new In te rn a tio n a l V aluation
Guidelines.

DEVELOPING BEST ESTIMATES
As the private equity industry has
matured in the United States, so has
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the need for greater consistency of
reported results and valuation stan
dards by managers of, and investors
in private equity funds. The pro
posed FASB Fair Value M easure
ments Standard focuses additional
attention on PE valuation issues. The
PEIGG Valuation Guidelines were
designed to provide a framework
whereby private equity investments
could be valued in accordance with
GAAP, using consistent and trans
paren t m ethodologies. Ju dgm ent

In the

will always need to be exercised by
the m anager in determ in in g the
value of an investment in a private
company. However, application of
the Guidelines will encourage man
agers to proactively but prudently
determ ine changes in the value of
their investments. As a result, a sim
plistic cost bias to the most recent
round of financing will be elim i
nated, and managers and investors
will be able to base decisions and
record investments using the best

KNOW

By Jam es R. H itc h n e r, C P A /A B V , ASA, The F in a n cia l V a lu a tio n G roup, A tla n ta ,
a m em b e r o f th e F in a n c ia l C o n su ltin g Group
Editor’s note: This article is modified
from “Litigation Services and Fees:
What Clients Need to Know, ” Finan
cial V a lu a tio n an d L itig a tio n
E xpert magazine, June-July, 2006,
copyright Valuation Products and Ser
vices, LC, www.valuationproducts.com.
It is used with permission.

Did you know that financial experts’
fees are often higher when they pro
vide litigation services than when
they provide o th e r services? O f
course you did. However, the real
q u estio n should be, “Do clients
know ?” A lth o u g h m any clients
understand why their attorneys’ fees
are high, they do not understand
why the financial experts’ fees may
be high as well. We’re not talking
about hourly rates as much as the
num ber of hours financial experts
spend p re p a rin g and d efen d in g
their work, conclusions, and opin
ions. So, the next time a client asks
why your expert fees are so high,
show them this article.
Fees are high because a good
financial expert is detail-minded and
knows that he or she must have good
com m and of the facts and proce
dures in an engagem ent. Why is
such detailed knowledge needed?
The answer is that a number of attor

neys will try to m ake a financial
expert look biased, unprepared, or
unqualified, even though he or she
is not. Experienced experts know
and anticipate the opposition that
they will face. They understand that
attorneys are advocates whose job is
to convince a trier-of-fact that an
expert is wrong, even if both the
e x p e rt and, often, the opposing
counsel know th a t the e x p e rt is
right. The judicial system for attor
neys is an advocacy system, a fact that
is u n d e rsto o d and resp e c te d by
financial experts who work in litiga
tion services.

WHAT CLIENTS MUST UNDERSTAND
So what do clients need to know?
They need to know that it takes time
and fees to enable experts to with
stand potentially misdirected crossex am ination. C onsequently, the
num ber of hours required and the
related fees are much higher in dis
pute work than in o th er types of
work. Experts must always be inde
p e n d e n t and objective, bu t they
must also defend what they believe
to be the correct opinion or conclu
sion, regardless of how much oppos
ing counsel tries to u n d e rm in e
them. For experts, part of doing a

estimate of fair value resulting from
utilizing a m ore com prehensive
group of valuation techniques. X
David L. Larsen, CPA, is a partner in KPMG
LLP’s Transaction Services Practice, based
in San Francisco. He leads the Institutional
Investor segment of KPMG’s Private Equity
practice. He is a special adviser to the
Board of Directors of the ILPA and serves
as technical adviser and project manager
to PEIGG and PEIGG’s Valuation Subcom
m itte e . The opinions in this a rtic le are
those of Mr. Larsen and not necessarily the
opinions of KPMG, ILPA, or PEIGG.

good job is to anticipate attacks on
their work that are not always fair.
Experts should never be advocates
for their client’s position, but they
can and should be advocates of their
own in d e p e n d e n t and objective
opinions and they m ust take the
steps necessary to defend their work
properly.
Furtherm ore, financial experts
need to keep abreast of the con
stantly changing developm ents in
their industry. Finally, experts must
expect that anything they have writ
ten in the past may become part of
an attorney’s attempt to discredit the
expert. Coping with these expecta
tions and issues requires prepara
tion, which takes time.
So, all your current and potential
clients must remember that provid
ing expert testimony includes the
work of anticipating and preparing
an appropriate defense of the opin
ions given, which means that the
fees for litigation-related work are
often much higher than for nonliti
gation work. Computing the value
or economic damages related to a
company can be hard; defending
such work is even harder and is the
point at which the rubber really hits
the road. This article is intended to
help clients understand the envi
ronm ent in which financial experts
work and defend th eir opinions,
and again, to explain why litigation
services can an d o fte n will be
expensive. Remember: Show this arti
cle to a client next time they ask
about your fees. X

5

Summer 2006

CPAE xpert

E xpert

RESPONSES

REVISITING REGRESSION ANALYSIS
AND THE MARKET APPROACH
I read with interest the article by
James A. DiGabriele, CPA, “A Primer
in Valuing Closely Held Companies
Using the M arket A pproach and
Regression Analysis,” in the Spring
2006 issue of CPA Expert, which sets
forth what I believe to be the best
approach to using m arket transac
tion databases in the valuation of
small businesses. However, in his
enthusiasm for regression analysis,
the author misinterprets some of the
regression output metrics and uses,
for one of his examples, the wrong
reason for choosing a particu lar
model from a selection.

The F ratio is a binary metric; that is,
either the model as a whole is signifi
cant, or it is not. There is no sliding
scale of significance whereby one
m odel’s higher F ratio indicates a
b e tte r eq u atio n than one with a
lower F ratio. It is better to look at
their respective standard errors and
adjusted R2 values to make a choice
among them.

pendent variables are added to an
equation. This can lead to “fishing
e x p e d itio n s ,” w hereby we keep
adding variables to an equation,
some of which have no conceptual
relationship to the dependent vari
able, just to inflate the R2 value. To
“penalize” the addition of extra vari
ables that do not really belong, an
adjusted R2 value is typically listed in
regression outputs. If we add vari
ables and the adjusted R2 decreases,
then the extra variables are essen
tially not pulling their weight and
should probably be omitted. If, on
the other hand, adjusted R2increases
with the addition of other indepen
d e n t variables, th e n we have
increased the explanatory power of
the model. So the author’s appeal to
ever-higher R2 values as indicative of
superior regression models doesn’t
ring true, because he has created
those h ig h er R2 values simply by
adding more independent variables.
For multiple regression, adjusted R2
is the s u p e rio r m etric to R2 for
choosing among models.

The F ratio

The Durbin-Watson statistic

Multicollinearity

The Durbin-Watson (D-W) statistic is
germane only if one is doing time
series analysis. Because the market
transaction databases are cross-sec
tional in nature, the D-W statistic can
be ignored. If one obtains a D-W sta
tistic that indicates autocorrelation
in a cross-sectional study, then just
randomly sort the data to solve the
problem.

M ulticollinearity in a pred ictio n
model, as opposed to a causation
model, is not necessarily problematic
in accurate forecasts of value. It can
cause trouble, however, when con
founding variables produce coeffi
cient signs that are reversed from
th eir norm al and intuitive value,
because this is difficult to explain to
a trier-of-fact.

R2
Although the R2 value is one of the
m ost fre q u e n tly q u o te d values
derived from a regression analysis, it
does have one serious drawback: It
can only increase when extra inde-

Model metrics

6

The author suggests that R2 and F
ratios are the metrics of choice when
choosing the best model for valua
tion purposes. However, he ignores
the very first metric one should turn

to in a multiple regression environ
ment, namely, the individual t-statis
tic for each independent variable.
The rule of thumb is that any inde
pendent variable with a t-statistic of
less than 2 should be considered for
removal from the model, and that
absolutely any t-statistic of less than 1
ought to be removed. Once you have
a model that consists only of signifi
cant in d e p e n d e n t variables, you
should then choose the model that
has the lowest standard error and
the highest adjusted R2value.
Market transaction databases

The market transaction databases we
have to work with (Pratt’s Stats, Bizcomps, etc.) supply a limited number
of independent variables with which
to run a regression analysis. As such,
the author has used sales, total assets,
and some form of net income as his
independent variables in both indus
tries. The problem is that all three of
these variables are size-oriented; that
is, com panies with large revenue
amounts tend to have large amounts
of assets and net incomes. This rela
tionship creates the multicollinearity
problem mentioned above, because
each ad d itio n al variable d o e sn ’t
explain anything new. The use of
adjusted R2 would, of course, have
made this evident. Perhaps the use of
ratios, such as total assets/sales or net
income/sales, as independent vari
ables would produce more powerful
models. However, the principle of
Occam’s Razor (which tells us that
entities should not be m ultiplied
needlessly, and that the simplest of
two competing theories is to be pre
ferred) requires us to use the sim
plest explanation available, and that
is why regressing price against rev
enue or some form of net income
will usually produce the best answer
with a model that gives us the best fit
as measured by the proper metrics.
Respectfully,
Mark G. Filler, CPA/ABV, CBA, AM, CVA
Filler & Associates, P.A.
Portland, Maine
www.filler.com
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AUTHOR'S RESPONSE

The Durbin-Watson statistic

Mr. Filler obviously shares my enthu
siasm for using regression analysis in
valuation. Here are my responses to
his criticisms:

The purpose of the article was to cre
ate awareness. Every basic economet
rics course introduces this statistic as
part of regression diagnostics. Yes, it
is true that the Durbin-Watson statis
tic is prevalent in time-series analysis.
Mr. Filler admitted that autocorrela
tion may also occur in cross-section
data. In the end, it adds value to
introduce this statistic.

The F ratio

The F test compares the fit of two
equations, in which the more com
p licated eq u atio n (the one with
m ore variables) fits better (has a
sm aller sum-of-squares) than the
sim ple eq u atio n with fewer vari
ables. The question is whether this
decrease in sum-of-squares is worth
the cost of the additional variables
(degrees of freedom ). The F test
answers this question. The refer
ence to the stan d ard e rro r, also
called the root mean square error,
refers to the standard deviation of
the data about the regression line,
rather than about the sample mean.
The objective of my article is to pro
vide a primer. The topic of standard
errors appears to be outside the
scope of a prim er article however,
but is relevant to an extension of
this article.

R2
Again, the article was clearly entitled
“A Primer. “ The reader interested in
applying these concepts in practice
needs to first understand R2 before
adjusted R2. This explanation clearly
does just that.
Multicollinearity

The topic of multicollinearity is nec
essary for the reader to understand
from inception that correlation of
variables may not be good in all cases.
Model metrics

The article attempted to introduce
topics as they would be introduced in

EQUITY RISK PREMIUM: 2006 UPDATE
By Roger J. G ra b o w sk i, ASA
Are you aware of recent research
questioning the use of those realized
equity premiums as an estimate of
the equity risk prem ium (ERP)?1,123
Or, do you simply choose to ignore
the research?
ERP is a forward-looking concept.
ERP is an expectation as of the valua
tion date for w hich no “m ark et
quotes” are observable. Although
you can observe premiums realized
over time by referring to historical
data, such calcu lated prem ium s

serve only as estim ates for the
expected ERP. If we truly want to
mimic the market, our goal must be
to estimate the true expected ERP as
of the valuation date. To do that, you
need to look beyond the realized
premiums.
Although there is no single, uni
versally accepted standard for esti
mating ERP, you must be aware of
recent research and not blindly use
the historical realized equity premi
ums reported in the SBBI Yearbook.3

an introductory regression/econometrics course. Most follow this intro
duction of these topics. The point
made here is for another day. The
foundation must come first, and then
these concepts may be introduced.
Market Transaction Databases

Many published articles have used
the same type of independent vari
ables. I am not sure why ratios of the
same variables would not be referred
to as size bias, since the numbers are.
The author of the critique refers to
regressing price against revenue or
net income. Model 2 does that.
There is a dearth of continuing
professional education courses on this
topic for valuation professionals.
Therefore, I think it would be produc
tive for our peers if the author and I
were to collaborate on a part II of the
article discussed here for future publi
cation in CPA Expert. I will go further
and extend an invitation to the author
of this critique to collaborate on the
development of a course on this topic.
Thank you,
James A. DiGabriele, D.P.S., CPA/ABV
The methods used can be broadly
c a teg o rized in to one of two
approaches: the realized return or ex
post approach, and the forward-look
ing or ex ante approach.

EX POST APPROACH
T he realized re tu rn a p p ro a c h
employs the premium that investors
have, on the average, realized over
some historical holding period (his
to rical realized p rem iu m ). T he
underlying theory is that the past
provides an indicator of how the
market will behave in the future, and
investors’ expectations are influ
enced by the historical performance
of the m arket. If p e rio d ic (say,

1 Readers interested in more detailed information on the ERP issue are invited to attend the American Society of Appraisers’ Center for Advanced Business Valuation
Studies Cost of Capital course and to read Grabowski and King, Chapter 1, “Equity Risk Premium,” in The Handbook of Business Valuation and Intellectual Property Analysis,
(McGraw-Hill, 2004); “Equity Risk Premium: What Valuation Consultants Need to Know About Current Research” Valuation Strategies (Sept/Oct 2003); “Equity Risk Pre
mium: What Valuation Consultants Need to Know About Current Research—2005 Update,” Valuation Strategies (Sept/Oct 2005); “Equity Risk Premium—What is the
Current Evidence,” Business Valuation Review (Fall 2005).
2 The equity risk premium (ERP) (sometimes referred to as the market risk premium) is defined as the extra return (over the expected yield on government securities)
that investors expect to receive from an investment in a diversified portfolio of common stocks. ERP = Rm - Rf where Rm is the expected return on a fully diversified
portfolio of equity securities and Rf is the rate of return expected on an investment free of default risk.
3 Stocks, Bonds, Bills and Inflation Valuation Edition 2006 Yearbook (Ibbotson Associates, 2006).
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monthly) returns are serially inde
pendent (i.e., not correlated) and if
expected returns are stable through
time, the arithmetic average of his
torical returns provides an unbiased
estimate of expected future returns.
A more indirect justification for use
of the historical approach is the con
tention that, for whatever reason,
securities in the past have been
priced so as to earn the retu rn s
observed. By using the historical real
ized prem iu m in applying the
income approach to valuation (i.e.,
in the discounted cash-flow valuation
method), one may, to some extent,
replicate this level of pricing.
Academics often formulate their
research in terms of the equity risk
premium relative to Treasury bills.
But the variability of Treasury bill
returns is such that one can hardly
consider them riskless. Further, we
are generally valuing closely held
businesses. Those investments are
generally considered long term, and
long-term government bonds are the
benchmark security we use in devel
oping discount rates. Therefore, in
this article, we have reported the
research results in terms of the pre
mium over long-term governm ent
bonds in calculating the historical
realized premium.4 In applying the
realized return method, the analyst
selects the number of years of histori
cal return data to include in the aver
age. One school of thought holds
that the future is best estimated using
a very long horizon of past returns.
Another school of thought holds that
the future is best measured by the
(relatively) recent past. These differ
ences in opinion produce disagree
m ent as to the num ber of years to
include in the average.
Although the SBBI Yearbook con
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tains sum m aries of
returns on U.S. stocks
Exhibit 1. Historical Realized Equity Risk
and bonds derived from
Premiums: Stock Market Returns Versus
the data that have been
Treasury Bonds (Income Returns)
a c cu m u lated by the
Center for Research in
Arithmetic Geometric
Period
Security Prices (CRSP)
5.1%
2 0 years (since 1 9 8 6 )
6.4%
at the U niversity of
4.9%
3 0 years (since 1 9 7 6 )
6.0%
C hicago since 1926,
good stock market data
4.2%
2.9%
4 0 years (since 1 9 6 6 )
are available back to
5.0%
3.8%
5 0 years (since 1 9 5 6 )
1871, and less reliable
7.1%
5.2%
8 0 years (since 1 9 2 6 )
data are available from
6.7%
4.9%
1 0 6 years (since 1 9 0 0 )
various sources back to
the en d of the e ig h 
4.3%
1 3 4 years (since 1 8 7 2 )
5.9%
teenth century. Data for
5.1%
3.6%
2 0 8 years (since 1 7 9 8 )
yields on governm ent
bonds are also available
tion that history will repeat itself and
for these p e rio d s .5
such a premium return will again be
Exhibit 1 above displays realized
realized (on the average) in the
average annual premiums of stock
future.
m ark et re tu rn s (relative to the
income return on long-term govern
SELECTION OF THE OBSERVATION PERIOD
ment bonds) for alternative periods
The historical realized prem ium
through 2005.
derived from realized returns is sen
The historical realized premium
sitive to the period chosen for the
is measured by comparing the stock
average. For exam ple, if one
market returns realized during the
in clu d es in the average only
p e rio d to the incom e re tu rn on
observed premiums in the immedi
bonds. Although the stock market
return cannot be ascertained at the
ate past period, that ex post premium
may be the inverse of the ex ante esti
beginning of the investment period,
m ate th a t analysts are seeking.
the rate of interest promised on a
Almost all practitioners who use his
long-term g o v e rn m e n t b o n d is
torical data focus on a longer run
known in terms of the yield to matu
view of historical returns. But the
rity. Therefore, analysts measure the
selection of the period over which to
stock market returns realized over
the expected returns on bonds. An
measure those returns is key.
The selection of 1926 as a starting
investor makes a decision to invest in
point is a happenstance of the arbi
the stock market today by comparing
trary selection of that date by the
the expected return from that invest
founders of the CRSP database. The
ment to the return on a benchmark
average calculated using 1926 return
security (in this case, the long-term
data as a beginning point may be too
government bond), given the rate of
heavily influenced by the unusually
re tu rn today on th at benchm ark
low interest rates during the 1930s to
security. T he realized re tu rn
mid 1950s. Some observers have sug
approach is based on the expecta

4 In applying the ERP in, say, the CAPM, one must use the return on a risk-free security with a term (maturity) consistent with the benchmark security used in developing
the ERP. For example, this article measures ERP in terms of the premium over that of long-term government bonds. In CAPM, ke = Rf + (Beta _ ERP). The Rf used as of
the valuation date should be the yield on a long-term government bond because the data cited herein have been developed comparing equity returns to the income
return (i.e., the yield promised at issue date) of long-term government bonds.
5 See Fisher and Lorie, “Rates of Return on Investments in Common Stocks,” 37-1 Journal of Business (1964); Wilson and Jones, “A Comparison of Annual Stock Market
Returns: 1871-1925 with 1926-1985,” 60-2 Journal of Business 1 (1987); Schwert, “Indexes of Common Stock Returns from 1802 to 1987,” 60-3 Journal of Business 239
(1990); Ibbotson and Brinson, Global Investing (McGraw-Hill, 1993); Wilson and Jones, “An Analysis of the S&P 500 Index and Cowles’s Extensions: Price Indexes and
Stock Returns, 1870-1999,” 75-3 Journal of Business 505 (2002); Wright, “Measures of Stock Market Value and Returns for the US Nonfinancial Corporate Sector, 19002000,” Working paper, 2/1/02.; Goetzmann, Ibbotson and Peng, “A New Historical Database for the NYSE 1815 to 1925: Performance and Predictability,” Journal of
Financial Markets 4 (2001) 1-32; Dimson, Marsh, and Staunton, Triumph of the Optimists: 101 Years of Global Investment Returns (Princeton University Press, 2002) with
annual updates of their Global Returns database for 17 countries, including the United States, available at www.ibbotson.com.
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gested th a t the p e rio d , which
includes the 1930s, 1940s, and the
immediate post-World War II boom
p e rio d , may have e x h ib ite d an
unusually high average realized
return premium. If we disaggregate
the 80 years reported in the SBBI
Yearbook into two sub-periods, the
first covering the periods before and
after the mid 1950s, we get the fol
lowing comparative figures for stock
and b o n d re tu rn s as shown in
Exhibit 2 on page 10.
The period since the mid 1950s
has been characterized by a more
stable stock m ark et an d a m ore
volatile bond market compared to
the earlier period. Interest rates have
become m ore volatile in the later
period.6 The effect is amplified in
the volatility of bond total returns.7
These data indicate that the relative
risk of stocks versus bonds is lower
today, which indicates that the equity
risk premium is likely lower today.
Thus, the historical arithmetic aver
age realized prem ium reported in
the SBBI Yearbook, as measured from
1926, likely overstates the expected
returns as of 2006.
If the average expected return on
stocks has changed through time,
the averages of realized re tu rn s
using the longest available data
become questionable. A short-run
horizon may give a better estimate if
changes in econom ic conditions
have created a different expected
retu rn environm ent than th at of
more remote past periods. For exam
ple, why not use the average realized
return over the past 20-year period?
A drawback of using averages over
shorter periods is that they are sus
ceptible to the high volatility of
annual stock returns that gives rise to
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large errors in measuring the true
ERP. Also, the average of the real
ized premiums over the past 20 years
may overstate to d ay ’s ex p ected
returns as a result of the general
downward m ovem ent of in terest
rates since 1981.
Even using long-term observa
tions, the volatility of annual stock
returns is high. For example, the
standard deviation of the realized
average return for the entire 80-year
period from 1926 to 2005 is approxi
mately 20%. Even assuming that the
80-year average gives an unbiased
estimate, a 95% confidence interval
for the unobserved true ERP still
spans a range of approximately 2.7%
to 11.5%.

WHICH AVERAGE— ARITHMETIC OR
GEOMETRIC?
Realized return premiums measured
using geometric (compound) aver
ages are always less than those using
the arithmetic average. The choice
of which average to use remains a
matter of disagreement among prac
titioners. The arithm etic average
receives the most support in the lit
erature,8910other authors recommend
a geometric average,9 and still others
support something in between.10The
use of the arithmetic average relies
on the assumption that (1) market
returns are serially independent (not
correlated) and (2) the distribution
of market returns is stable (not timevarying). Under these assumptions,
an arithmetic average gives an unbi
ased estim ate of expected future
returns. Empirical studies generally
indicate a fairly low degree of serial
correlation, supporting use of the
arithm etic average. Moreover, the
more observations, the more accu

rate the estimate will be.
But even if one agrees that stock
returns are serially independent, the
arithmetic average of one-year real
ized premiums may not be the best
estimate of future premiums. Text
book models of stock returns (e.g.,
CAPM) are generally single-period
models that estimate returns over
unspecified investment horizons. As
the investment horizon increases,
the arithm etic average of realized
premiums decreases asymptotically
to the g eom etric average of the
entire realized premium series. As a
result, some recommend using the
midpoint of the arithmetic average
of one-year realized premiums and
the geometric average of the entire
realized premium series as the best
estimate of the future premiums if
one is using historical realized pre
miums as the basis for the future
ERP estimate.11

EXPECTED ERP VERSUS REALIZED EQUITY
PREMIUMS
Recently, m uch has been w ritten
com paring the realized returns as
reported in sources such as the SBBI
Yearbook, with the ERP that must have
been expected by investors given the
underlying economics of publicly
traded com panies (i.e., expected
growth in earnings or expected
growth in dividends) and the underly
ing economics of the economy (i.e.,
expected growth in gross domestic
product [GDP]). Such studies con
clude that investors could not have
expected as large an ERP as the
equity premiums actually realized.
Roger Ibbotson and Peng Chen
have reported on their study of esti
m ated forward-looking long-term
su stain ab le equity re tu rn s and

6 As reflected in Ibbotson Associates’ Long-term Treasury Bond Income Return statistics.
7 As reflected in Ibbotson Associates’ Long-term Treasury Bond Total Returns, which include the capital gains and losses associated with interest rate fluctuations.

8 E.g., Kaplan, “Why the Expected Rate of Return Is an Arithmetic Average,” 14-3 Business Valuation Review 126 (September 1995); Stocks, Bonds, Bills and Inflation Valuation
Edition 2005 Yearbook, (Ibbotson Associates, 2005) pp. 75-77; Kritzman, “What Practitioners Need to Know About Future Value,” 50-3 Financial Analysts Journal 12
(May/June 1994); Bodie, Kane, and Marcus, Investments (Richard D. Irwin, Inc.,1989) p. 720.

9 E.g., Damodaran, Investment Valuation, 2nd ed. (John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 2002) p. 161.
10 Copeland, Koller and Murrin, Valuation: Measuring and Managing the Value of Companies, 3rd ed. (John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 2000) p. 218; Koller, Goedhart, and Wessels, Valu
ation: Measuring and Managing the Value of Companies, 4th ed. (John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 2005), p. 299-302; Cornell, The Equity Risk Premium (John Wiley & Sons, Inc.,1999) p.
36; Julius, “Market Returns in Rolling Multi-Year Holding Periods: An Alternative Interpretation to Ibbotson Data,” 15-2 Business Valuation Review 57 (June 1996).
11 Note 10, supra.
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Exhibit 2. Historical Realized Returns: Relative Volatility of
Stock Returns to Bond Returns
1 9 2 6 -1 9 5 7

1 9 5 8 -2 0 0 5

Realized Equity Risk Premiums Over Treasury Bond Income
Returns Nominal (i.e., Without Inflation Removed)

Arithmetic Averages

9.5%

5.4%

Geometric Average

6.6%

4.2%

STANDARD DEVIATIONS
Stock M arket Annual Returns

24.8%

16.7%

0.5%
4.9%

2.4%
11.0%

5 .1

1 .5

Long-term Treasury Bond
Income Returns
Total Returns
Ratio of Equity to Bond
Total Return Volatility

Source: Ibbotson Associates’ data; calculations by author.

expected ERPs.12 They first analyzed
historical equity returns by decom
posing returns into factors including
inflation, earnings, dividends, priceto-earnings ratios, dividend-payout
ratio s, book values, re tu rn s on
equity, and GDP per capita. They
fo recast w hat could have been
expected as an ERP through “supplyside” models built from historical
data. In the most recent update to
this study, reported in the SBBI Year
book, Ibbotson Associates determined
that the long-term ERP that could
have been e x p e cte d , given the
underlying economics, was approxi
mately 6.3% on an arithmetic basis
(4.2% on a geometric basis) com
pared to the historical realized risk
premium of 7.1% on an arithmetic
basis (5.2% on a geometric basis).
The greater-than-expected historical
realized equity returns were caused
by an unexpected increase in market
multiples relative to economic fun
damentals (i.e., a decline in the dis
count rates).

What caused the decline in dis
count rates that led to the unex
pected capital gain? The marginal
income tax rate declined (the mar
ginal tax rate on corporate distribu
tions averaged 43% in the 1955-1962
period and averaged only 17% in the
1987-2000 period), and equity invest
ments could not be held “tax free” in
1962. By 2000, however, equity invest
ment could be held “tax deferred” in
defined benefit and contribution
pension plans and in individual
retirement accounts. The decrease in
income tax rates on corporate distri
butions and the inflow of retirement
plan investment capital into equity
investments combined to lower dis
count rates and increase market mul
tiples relative to economic funda
mentals.13
If it is assumed that investors did
not anticipate the changes in factors
that caused declining discount rates,
it becomes clear that the true ERP
during this period has been less than
the historical realized premium cal

culated as the arithmetic average of
excess returns realized since 1926. If
it is further assumed that a repetition
of such changes is neither likely nor
anticipated by investors, then the
true ERP as of today can also be
expected to be less than the histori
cal realized premium.

EX ANTE APPROACHES
Merrill Lynch publishes “bottom-up”
expected return estimates for the
S&P 500 stock index derived from
averaging return estimates for stocks
in the Standard & Poors (S&P) 500
Index. Although Merrill Lynch does
not cover every company in the S&P
500 Index, it does cover a high per
centage of the companies measured
in market value terms. Merrill Lynch
uses a multistage dividend discount
model (DDM) to calculate expected
returns for several hundred compa
nies using projections from its own
securities analysts. The resulting data
are published monthly in the Merrill
Lynch publication Quantitative Pro
files. The M errill Lynch expected
return estimates have indicated an
implied ERP ranging from 3% to 7%
in recent years (approximately 6.6%
at the end of 2005), with an average
over the last 15 years of approxi
mately 4.6%.14
O ne study re p o rts the results
from a series o f surveys of ch ief
financial officers (CFOs) of U.S. cor
porations conducted from mid 2000
to the en d o f 2005. T h a t study
reports that the range of ERP given a
10-year investment horizon was 3.6%
to 4.7% (premium over 10-year Trea
sury bonds). The most recent survey
re p o rts an ERP given a 10-year
investment horizon was 4.7% on an
arithmetic average basis (2.4% on a
geometric average basis).15

12 Ibbotson and Chen, “Long-Run Stock Returns, Participating in the Real Economy,” 59-1 Financial AnalystsJournal 88 (January/February 2003) updated in Stocks, Bonds,
Bills and Inflation, Valuation Edition 2006 Yearbook (Ibbotson Associates, 2006) p. 98.

13 McGrattan and Prescott, “Is the Market Overvalued?” Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis Quarterly Review (24, 2000) and “Taxes, Regulations and Asset Prices,” Federal
Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, Working Paper 610 (July 2001).
14 Use of analyst projections leads one to the literature on analyst projection bias (i.e., are analyst forecasts overly optimistic?). For example, see Ramnath, Rock, and Stone,
“Value Line and I/B/E/S earnings forecasts,” Working Paper (Nov 2001). The authors report the results of projected earnings amounts, rather than growth rates. (They
use the I/B/E/S long-term growth rate to project the EPS four years into the future, and compares this with the actual EPS four years in the future. The results indicate
that I/B/E/S mean forecast error in year 4 EPS is negative. This can be tr anslated into a preliminary typical growth rate adjustment for, say, a projected 15% growth rate
as follows: ((1,15^4) (1-.0545))^ .25 -1 = 13.4%, implying a ratio of actual to forecast of .134/.15 = .89. This would imply that equity risk premium forecasts using analyst
forecasts are biased high. See also, Bonini, Zanetti and Bianchini, ‘Target Price Accuracy in Equity Research,” Working Paper (Jan 2006).
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Elroy Dimson, Paul Marsh, and
Mike Staunton studied the realized
equity returns and historical equity
premiums for 17 countries (includ
ing the U.S.) from 1900 to the end
of2005.16
These authors report that the his
torical equity premiums have been
6.5% on an arithmetic basis (4.6% on
a geom etric basis) for the United
States (in excess of the total return on
bonds) and 5.2% on an arithmetic
basis (4.0% on a geometric basis) for
the total of the 17 countries.
They observe larg e r equity
returns earned in the second half of
the twentieth century compared to
the first half resulting from (1) cor
porate cash flows growing faster than
investors anticipated, fueled by rapid
technological change and unprece
dented growth in productivity and
efficiency; (2) transaction and moni
toring costs falling over the course of
the century; (3) inflation rates gen
erally declining over the final two
decades of the century and resulting
in an increase in real interest rates;
and (4) required rates of return on
equity declining as a result of dimin
ished business and investment risks.
They conclude that the observed
increase in the overall price-to-divi
dend ratio over the century is attrib
utable to a long-term decrease in the
required risk premium, a decrease
th a t will n o t c o n tin u e in to the
future. The authors note that:
Further adjustments should almost
certainly be made to historical risk premi
ums to reflect long-term changes in capi
tal market conditions. Since, in most
countries corporate cash flows historically
exceeded investors’ expectations, a further
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downward adjustment is in order.
They conclude that a downward
adjustment in the expected ERP com
pared to the historical equity premi
ums resulting from the increase in
the price dividend ratio is reasonable.
Further, they conclude that a further
downw ard ad ju stm en t in the
expected ERP of approximately 50 to
100 basis points is plausible if one
assumes that the current level of divi
dend yield will continue (versus the
greater historical average yield).
Removing the historical increase
in the price dividend ratio and adjust
ing the historical average dividend
yield to today’s dividend yield results
in an expected equity premium (rela
tive to bonds) of approximately 4.8%
to 5.3% on an arithmetic basis (2.8%
to 3.3% on a geometric basis) for the
United States and 3.5% to 4.0% on
an arithmetic basis (2.4% to 2.9% on
a geometric basis) for a world index
(denominated in U.S. dollars for 17
countries).17
The SBBI Yearbook reports on an
u p d ate to the work a u th o re d by
Ibbotson and Chen, forecasting an
ERP based on the contribution of
earnings growth to price to earn
ings ratio growth and on growth in
p e r c a p ita GDP (a supply-side
a p p r o a c h ) .18 T hey rem ove the
increase in historical returns attrib
utable to the overall increase in
price-to-earnings ratio from 1926 to
2005 resulting in an estim ate of
ERP at the end of 2005 of approxi
mately 6.3% on an arithmetic basis
(4.2% on a geometric basis).
William Goetzmann and Ibbot
son, commenting on the supply-side
approach of estimating expected risk

premiums, note:
These forecasts tend to give somewhat
lower forecasts than historical risk premi
ums, primarily because part of the total
returns of the stock market have come
from price-earnings ratio expansion. This
expansion is not predicted to continue
indefinitely, and should logically be
removedfrom the expected risk premium.19
Tim Koller, Marc Goedhart, and
David Wessels conclude on th eir
assessment of the research and evi
dence:
Although many in the finance profes
sion disagree about how to measure the
ERP, we believe 4.5 to 5.5 percent is the
appropriate ranged.20

CONCLUSION
Estim ating the ERP is one of the
most im portant issues involved in
estimating the cost of capital of the
subject business. One needs to con
sider a variety of alternative sources,
including realized returns over vari
ous periods and forward-looking esti
mates such as those implied from
projections of future prices, divi
dends, and earnings.
What is a reasonable estimate of
ERP in 2006? Considering long-run
historical arithmetic averages of real
ized returns, this author concludes
that the post-1925 historical arith
metic average of one-year realized
premiums as reported in the SBBI
Yearbook results in an expected ERP
estimate that is too high. My conclu
sion is based on the works of various
researchers (e.g., Dimson, Marsh and
Staunton, Goetzmann and Ibbotson)
and cu rre n t m arket expectations
(e.g., the survey of CFOs).
A num ber of appraisers express

15 Graham and Harvey, “Expectations of Equity Risk Premia, Volatility and Asymmetry from a Corporate Finance Perspective,” National Bureau of Economic Research
working paper, December 2001, updated quarterly by Duke CFO Outlook Survey (www.cfosurvey.org); “The Equity Risk Premium in January 2006: Evidence from the
Global CFO Outlook Survey,” Dec 19, 2005.
16 Dimson, Marsh, and Staunton, “Global Evidence on the Equity Premium,” 15-4 The Journal of Applied Corporate Finance (Summer 2003); T h e Worldwide Equity Pre
mium: A Smaller Puzzle,” April 7, 2006; The Global Investment Returns Yearbook 2006 (ABN-AMRO/London Business School, 2006).
17 Based on this author’s converting premium over total returns on bonds as reported by Dimson, Marsh, and Staunton, removing the impact of the growth in price-divi
dend ratios from the geometric average historical premium, reducing the historical average dividend yield to a current dividend yield, and converting to an approxi
mate arithmetic average.
One method of converting the geometric average into an arithmetic average is to assume the returns are independently log-normally distributed over time. Then the
arithmetic and geometric averages approximately follow the relationship: The arithmetic average of returns for the period = Geometric average of returns for the period
+ (variance of returns for the p eriod/2).

18 Note 12, supra; Ibbotson, “Equity Risk Premium Forum,” AIMR, 11/8/01, pp. 100-104, 108.
19 Goetzmann and Ibbotson, “History and the Equity Risk Premium,” Yale ICF Working Paper No. 05-04 (April 2005), p. 8.

20 Note 10, supra: Koller et al., p. 306.
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dismay over the necessity of consid
ering a forward ERP since that would
re q u ire ch an g in g th e ir c u rre n t
“cookbook” practice of relying exclu
sively on the post-1925 historical
arithmetic average of one-year real
ized premiums reported in the SBBI
Yearbook as their estimate of the ERP.
My reply is that valuation is a for
ward-looking concept, not an exer
cise in mechanical application of for
mulas. C orrect valuation requires
applying value drivers reflected in
today’s market pricing. Our role is to
mimic the market. In the experience
of this au th o r, one often cannot
m atch current m arket pricing for
equities using the post-1925 histori
cal arithmetic average of one-year
realized premiums as the basis for
d eveloping d isc o u n t rates. The

entire appraisal process is based on
applying reasoned judgm ent to the
evidence derived from economic,
financial, and other information and
arriving at a well reasoned opinion
of value. Estimating the ERP is no
different. I challenge all appraisers
to look at the evidence.
After considering the evidence,
any reasonable long-term estimate of
the normal ERP as of 2006 should be
in the range of 3.5% to 6%.21
Roger Grabowski is a Managing Director of
Duff & Phelps LLC in C h icag o, IL. The
author thanks Ryan Brown and David Tur
ney of Duff and Phelps and form er col
league, David King, for their assistance.
N e v e rth e le s s , th e a u th o r a c c e p ts full
resp o n sib ility for th e final form of the
paper. Moreover, this work should not be
construed as representing the official posi
tion of any organization.

21 Where in this range is the current ERP? Research has shown that ERP is cyclical during the business cycle. If the
economy is near or in recession (as reflected in relatively recent low returns on stocks), the conditional ERP is
more likely at the higher end of the range. If the economy improves (with expectations of improvements
reflected in higher stock returns), the conditional ERP moves toward the midpoint of the range. If the economy
is near its peak (as reflected in relatively recent high stock returns), the conditional ERP is more likely at the
lower end of the range. This author will let the reader decide where his valuation date lies in the business cycle.

Win and Win Again
You all know that if you go to the gam
ing tables in a Las Vegas casino, the
odds are against your winning big. The
odds in your favor will increase, how
ever, if you go to Las Vegas September
2 8 - 2 9 , 2 0 0 6 to a tte n d th e AICPA
National Conference on Fraud and Liti
gation Services. The odds are very good
th a t you’ll find som ething of value
throughout the conference. During each
concurrent session period, two sessions
will be in the fraud track, two in the liti
gation services track, and one in the
fraud and litigation services track. So
you can’t lose, whatever your niche is.

Another Sure Win
Win again in Austin, TX. No gaming
tables, but a sure payoff if you attend the
AICPA National Business Valuation Con
ference, December 3 -8 , 2006. Always
drawing a big crowd, the BV Conference
offers opportunities to explore the latest
ideas, tools, and solutions for continued
success as a valuation analyst.
For more information about each con
ference, visit www.CPA2Biz.com or call
1-888-777-7077.
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